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Transpired the manager could survive defeat by Grimsby. He weathered a decisive continental showpiece against one of the worst Tottenham teams in living memory. He could survive home defeats to West Ham and Wolves, a lowly league position, the tactical inflexibility, squandering the team's most promising academy products, a poor winning percentage, labeling his team the worst in Manchester United history. Yet, there existed a single opponent against whom Ruben Amorim was not permitted to engage. You come at the sporting director, and you best not miss.

Regrettably, similar to numerous top-flight right-back in Blackburn’s championship 1994-95 season, Amorim came at the executive and seems to have failed. Even the most distracted of readers will notice the paradoxical situation: a manager who often railed at his players for failing in one-on-one duels crumbling in the face of the white heat and formidable presence of a England's top division's most intimidating sporting directors.

In truth, this entire bruising episode appears to portray the director in a whole new light. It may have been tempting, given his brief stint in a similar role at Southampton, to view Jason Wilcox as little more than a drudge in the United exoskeleton: an individual who owed his position as much to his friendship with his former boss a fellow executive rather than any demonstrable skill. How wrong we all were. In brilliantly outmanoeuvring United’s feted head coach, as he outmanoeuvred the unfortunate Dan Ashworth before him, he has proved himself as one of the sport’s true generals: a tactical intellect that United’s mid-table rivals will now be justifiably concerned.

A Strategic Clash Regarding Formation & Ideology

For example, it was the director , after being involved in the leadership that appointed the 3-4-3 fundamentalist the coach in the first place, was instrumental in trying to persuade him to abandon his favored formation. Unsurprisingly, these pleas were resisted. However, such directives carry more weight when delivered from the mouth with the unimpeachable soccer background of Jason Wilcox, holder of international appearances and a role in a championship team from 31 years ago.

Perhaps in time he may be persuaded to outline his thought processes to the rest of us. Perhaps at some point questions may arise why Amorim is departing with full compensation, without any penalty clause in place. But Jason Wilcox speaks rarely publicly, and with very good reason. The real thinkers of this sport – individuals such as him – simply operate at a level exceeding our mundane comprehension. Were he to speak, probably we would perceive is a series of high-frequency signals and complex calculations. Wanting is not quite the same as being prepared to comprehend it.

The Supreme Authority In the Throne

Naturally, by focusing our attention on the sporting director we are obscuring the true genius behind the club's current leadership. The director is, in reality, merely executing the directives of his superior Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who in private has made very clear his desire for a four-man defense. According to reports, Ratcliffe has also proposed deploying the forward as a right wing-back. Ratcliffe is keen for the club to adopt data science and metrics. Per reports, during a leadership summit soon after his investment, he declared that United’s style to football “will be determined by this group”.

After all, Sir Jim is an expert in this technical footballing stuff, leveraging his background in industry and sailing. Above all he is immensely wealthy, and as we all know, the rich are the best of us: more insightful, more wise, more tactically astute, simply superior. Whom else would you trust to oversee an enlightened programme of cost-cutting, the building of a modern arena that appears similar to an abstract design, the acquisition of a new striker?

The New Soccer Hierarchy: Directors Above Coaches

This is a trend that is becoming prevalent in top-tier football. For decades, clubs foolishly delegated major sporting choices to subordinate staff like managers, talent spotters – players themselves. Maybe previously possible for a young, innovative manager with ideas and energy to go into an organization and see their vision through to completion. But how many companies have these guys set up? How many mass redundancies have they overseen? Better by far to invest genuine authority where it belongs: the executive class, the casually dressed executives, the individuals with impressive professional resumes. It is wiser to determine the strategy in the boardroom and hire a coach who will adapt their methods to suit. If managers were formerly chefs, they are now more akin to delivery personnel: not responsible for the food, yet finally accountable should it be delivered poorly or leaks out of the box.

In the meantime, their job is increasingly less about crafting the philosophy and more about marketing it: the receptionist of the operation, the public face for a club they can do little to influence. A coach at Chelsea takes a squad of very young players into the Champions League and wins domestic cups, and effectively is dismissed for speaking out. Wilfried Nancy sees his reputation ruined while the people who hired him live to blunder indefinitely.

A Neoliberal Football: Accountability Only for the Few

And perhaps on some microcosmic level this is simply corporate governance at work: the rise of a gilded elite who are infallible, whose decisions remain untouchable, whose errors can invariably be sacked away without justification. Hire the 3-4-3 coach and then fire him for using too much 3-4-3. Hire the process guy and later bin him for requiring excessive time. And most importantly show gratitude; for the incremental season ticket price rises, for your new player acquisitions, for the reality that the grownups – regardless of their expertise – are in charge.